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Birds of a feather flock together; presumably they admire their peers’ plumage. There is a
wealth of evidence that members of a particular social group evaluate in-group members
more favorably than out-group members (e.g., Brewer and Kramer 1985; Brown 1986).
At least two possible explanations can account for this observation. One is that repeated
interactions within a group produce feelings of solidarity and identification which lead to
mutual admiration. Alternatively, people who appreciate one another may self-select into
the same social group. Economics has little to add to the first explanation. Accordingly,
this paper pursues the second line of argument.
The social contacts that a person has are influenced by his social roles and by factors
such as physical proximity, but they are also a matter of choice. People choose whom
to make friends with. Casual observation as well as academic research indicate that
attitudinal similarity is a major determinant of interpersonal attraction and positive so-
cial judgment (e.g., Newcomb 1961; Byrne 1971; Wittenbaum, Hubbell and Zuckerman
1999; McElwee et al. 2001). In other words, even after controlling for socio-economic
status, people prefer to associate with those who share similar views as their own. In his
book Republic.com, Cass Sunstein (2001) describes how the advent of information tech-
nology has enormously expanded the range of social contacts available to individuals.
By logging into internet chat rooms, for example, the choice of conversation partners
is not confined by physical distance or social status. But instead of increasing the ex-
change of opinion among people of diverse viewpoints, Sunstein argues that information
technology has led to an increasing fragmentation of the social space. The reason is
that people choose to expose themselves only to familiar viewpoints, and technology has
facilitated a more precise matching of individuals who share similar attitudes.
In this paper I develop a model of group formation which explains why people
prefer to exchange information with like-minded individuals. In this model people are
differentiated by their prior beliefs about some unknown state. They receive private
information about the state and exchange their information with others in their group.
There are two types of private signals. Informed persons observe real signals which
are partially revealing about the state, while uninformed persons observe bogus signals
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which are pure noise but are believed to be informative. I assume that an individual
derives utility from learning real signals; hence each tries to join the group which is
believed to contain the largest proportion of informed persons.
Internet chat rooms provide a convenient metaphor for the nature of the problem.
Of the many chat rooms that focus on a particular subject, the choice of which one
to join depends on who else is present in each chat room. I may enter a chat room
which I believe contains cogent and insightful arguments related to the subject. But
other people in the chat room may leave because they think that the quality of the
arguments deteriorates as I enter the discussion. It is therefore possible that this kind of
situation may admit no equilibrium, as is driven by the logic of Groucho Marx’s dictum.1
Nevertheless, for the setup described in this paper, equilibrium can be proved to exist.
In this equilibrium, society is segmented into two or more distinct groups. Members
of each group prefer to canvass opinion from one another than to sample views from
people in other groups, because everyone believes that members of his own group are
smarter (i.e., more likely to be informed) than members of other groups. Moreover,
the equilibrium has the interesting property that each group consists of individuals who
share similar beliefs; people with disparate views do not mingle together.
The intuition behind this result is not difficult to understand. Since each person—
informed or not—believes that his own private signal is informative, each will revise his
prior in the direction of the signal. As informative signals are correlated with the state
while uninformative signals are not, this updating process implies that the distribution
of posterior beliefs among informed persons is more clustered near the true state than is
the distribution of posterior beliefs among uninformed persons. Therefore, for a person
who believes that the state is θ0, say, he expects to find a high concentration of informed
persons among a group of people with posterior beliefs near θ0. To put it differently,
this person finds it unlikely that informed persons who have amended their priors based
on real signals would have posteriors that are far away from θ0. He concludes that a
group of people with beliefs far away from his own beliefs must consist predominantly of
1 The comedian Groucho Marx was reported to have said, “I don’t care to belong to a club that
accepts people like me as members.”
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uninformed persons; learning from their bogus signals would add little to his utility. To
be sure, such feelings are mutual. People with beliefs far away from θ0 do not want to
associate with those with beliefs near θ0, as they think that the other group must have
been influenced by pure noise. In this model, people evaluate others through the lens of
their own beliefs. There is no commonly agreed yardstick of who are informed and who
are not. This explains why the model can escape from Groucho Marx’s logic to admit
an equilibrium social structure.
The mechanism presented in this paper is related to Prendergast (1993). Prendergast
shows that using subjective information to evaluate the performance of subordinates
produces an incentive for subordinates to conform to the opinion of their supervisors.
Similarly, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) argue that when there is uncertainty regarding
whether information providers are well-informed, consumers of information infer that
those who produce reports that conform to consumers’ priors are more likely to be
competent. This paper does not discuss the strategic and organizational issues arising
from conformity, but focuses on the implications of subjective evaluation for equilibrium
social structure.
This model of equilibrium social structure shaped by differences in beliefs is closest
to the recent work by Murphy and Shleifer (2004). They assume that agents with beliefs
that are too dissimilar cannot influence one another. Therefore, the size of any group
cannot be too large and the centers of any two groups must be sufficiently far apart.
This paper seeks to go one step further by explaining why agents prefer to be influenced
by people with similar beliefs.
Currarini, Jackson and Pin (forthcoming) study the effects of homophily (“love of
own kind”) on the formation of friendship networks. In their model, individuals prefer
to make friends with others with similar demographic characteristics (such as race),
producing network structure with a high degree of clustering. The present work paper
does not adopt a network-theoretic approach. Individuals are differentiated along a
continuous dimension (their subjective beliefs), but the desire to seek informed opinion
leads to their partitioning into distinct social groups.
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1. The Structure of Information and Misinformation
There are two possible states of the world, sL and sR. The prior probability that an
individual attaches to state sR is denoted p. Sometimes it is convenient to work with log
odds ratios instead of probabilities; so I denote ρ = log(p/(1−p)). Assume a continuum
of agents with different priors. Let F (ρ) represent the mass of population with a prior
log odds ratio lower than ρ.
A fraction pi of the population are informed. Assume that whether a person is
informed or not does not depend on his beliefs. An informed individual i receives a
private signal Yi that is partially revealing about the true state. In particular, assume
Pr[Yi = L | sL] = Pr[Yi = R | sR] = q ∈ (0.5, 1).
Let k = log(q/(1− q)). By Bayes’ rule, an individual who observes Yi = R will have a
posterior log odds ratio of ρ′ = ρ+ k. Similarly, an individual who observes Yi = L will
have a posterior log odds ratio of ρ′ = ρ− k. Conditional on the state, the signal Yi is
identically and independently distributed across informed individuals.
A fraction 1−pi of the population are uninformed. Each uninformed agent i receives
a bogus signal Xi such that, regardless of the underlying state,
Pr[Xi = L] = Pr[Xi = R] = 0.5.
These signals are independently distributed across uninformed agents.
Since the distribution of the bogus signals does not depend on the state, they are
totally uninformative. Uninformed individuals are aware that only a fraction pi of the
population are informed. However, each uninformed person believes that he himself is
among one of the blessed. That is, an uninformed individual mistakenly thinks that
his private signal is Yi. Hence, a person who observes Xi = R revises his posterior to
ρ′ = ρ+ k, and a person who observes Xi = L revises his posterior to ρ′ = ρ− k.2
2. Social Networks and Information Exchange
2 This model does not depend on the assumption that everyone believes his own signal is informative.
Suppose each person attaches probability pi that his own signal is informative and probability 1 − pi
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Because of the assumption that signals are independently distributed across the popu-
lation, individuals will further update their beliefs if they know the realization of the
private signals of other informed agents. People therefore have an incentive to exchange
information and learn from one another. Unlike random sampling, much of this kind of
informational exchange occurs along established social ties. People do not talk to just
anyone on the street; they mostly talk to their friends. Even when the informational
flow is one way, the search for information is seldom random. People do not ask just
any expert for advice; they ask their trusted experts. Such non-random selection would
make sense if a person believes that people in his social group are systematically more
well-informed than other agents in the population. But how do different individuals
arrive at the conclusion that their own social groups are superior?
Some notation is needed to clarify the nature of this problem. Let there be two social
groups in the population, labeled L and R. I assume that social groups are formed after
each individual has received his private signal and that the exchange of information takes
place only within members of the same group. Suppose all individuals with posterior
belief ρ′ ∈ A belongs to group L, and all individuals with belief ρ′ #∈ A belongs to
group R. Such a partition is an equilibrium if L is preferred to R by all ρ′ ∈ A and
R is preferred to L by all ρ′ #∈ A. To focus on the interesting case, I require that the
preference is strict for at least some individuals.
To give content to this definition, I need to specify preferences over social groups.
Let φji (A) be the ratio of informed to uninformed persons in group j (j = L,R) in state
si (i = L,R). Individuals do not directly observe the fraction of informed agents in a
group, but they form expectations about this quantity using their subjective beliefs. Let
p′ be the posterior probability corresponding to the posterior log odds ratio ρ′. I assume
that the expected utility from joining group j (j = L,R) for a person with posterior
that his own signal is bogus. Let
k′ = log
piq + (1 − pi)(0.5)
pi(1− q) + (1− pi)(0.5)
> 0.
Then each person updates his belief to ρ + k′ upon observing a private signal R or to ρ − k′ upon
observing a private signal L. The argument in the next section goes through by replacing k with k ′.
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probability p′ is
U j(p′;A) = p′u(φjR(A)) + (1− p
′)u(φjL(A)), (1)
where u is an increasing function.
This assumption about people’s objective function departs from standard decision
theory, which postulates that individuals seek information in order to improve the qual-
ity of their decisions. Suen (2004) describes a model in which people seek information
to improve their decisions. In that model, experts coarsen continuous information into
binary signals, and individuals prefer to consult experts who share similar preferences
and beliefs as their own. More generally the cheap talk literature (e.g., Crawford and
Sobel 1982) shows that preference similarity tends to facilitate communication and im-
prove the quality of decision making. While I do not deny the instrumental value of
information, I argue that this is not the only—perhaps not even the dominant—motive
for seeking information in some situations. Consider, for example, the consumption of
political news and opinion. The probability that a voter is pivotal in any large election
is negligible. Yet people do talk about politics and social issues with friends, and some
spend considerable time and effort to follow campaign information. They may be doing
this for the sheer fun of it, or they may be trying to educate themselves or to impress
upon others. If academics specialize in the disinterested pursuit of truth, it is not hard
to imagine that other people may also treat information as a good in itself. But people
do not want to consume just any piece of information; they want to consume informed
opinion. Learning from a novel and valid argument is a delight, while listening to empty
chatter, cliche, or falsehood can be a pain. This is reflected in the assumption that
utility u is an increasing function of the ratio of informed to uninformed agents in the
group.
Alternatively, one may imagine that the primary motive behind the choice of social
groups is to establish social contacts and networks with successful people for future
career advancement or business opportunities; the exchange of information is merely
incidental to this dominant motive. If this is the case, and to the extent that informed
individuals are more intelligent and more likely to be (or become) successful people, then
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there are gains from joining a group with a greater fraction of informed agents.
With equation (1) as the criterion for the choice of social group, the following lemma
holds.
Lemma 1. Any equilibrium in which at least some individuals strictly prefer one group
to another is characterized by a critical pˆ such that a person with posterior belief p′ ≤ pˆ
belongs to one group a person with p′ > pˆ belongs to the other group.
Proof. Let ai be the fraction of all informed agents who belong to group L under state
si (i = L,R). Let b be the fraction of all uninformed agents who belong to group L.
(Note that b is state-independent because bogus signals are state-independent.) Then
φLL = piaL/((1− pi)b);
φLR = piaR/((1− pi)b).
Similarly,
φRL = pi(1− aL)/((1− pi)(1− b));
φRR = pi(1− aR)/((1− pi)(1− b)).
If aL > aR, then φLL > φ
L
R and φ
R
R > φ
R
L . In this case, U
L(p′;A)− UR(p′;A) is strictly
decreasing in p′. So if an individual with belief p0 prefers L to R, all individuals with
p′ < p0 prefer L and R. If aL < aR, then UL(p′;A)− UR(p′;A) is strictly increasing in
p′. So if individual with belief p0 prefers L to R, all individuals with p′ > p0 have the
same preference. Finally, if aL = aR, then either everybody strictly prefers one group
to another, or everybody is indifferent between the two groups. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 reduces the problem of finding an equilibrium partition to the problem of
finding a critical value pˆ.3 Assume without loss of generality that all agents with p′ ≤ pˆ
are in group L. Let ρˆ = log(pˆ/(1− pˆ)). Then, any agent whose prior is less than ρˆ+ k
and who observes a signal value of L will belong to this group. Any agent whose prior
is less than ρˆ − k and who observes a signal value of R will also belong to this group.
3 There is also a trivial equilibrium in which the composition of agents in group L is identical to
the composition of agents in group R. The trivial equilibrium is ruled out by the requirement that at
least some individuals strictly prefer one group to another.
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Therefore,
φLL =
pi(qF (ρˆ+ k) + (1− q)F (ρˆ− k))
(1− pi)(0.5F (ρˆ+ k) + 0.5F (ρˆ− k))
;
φLR =
pi((1− q)F (ρˆ+ k) + qF (ρˆ− k))
(1− pi)(0.5F (ρˆ+ k) + 0.5F (ρˆ− k))
.
Since q > 1 − q and F (ρˆ + k) > F (ρˆ − k), the relative proportion of informed to
uninformed persons in in group L is larger when the state is sL than when the state is
sR. This reflects the fact that informed individuals tend to revise their beliefs toward
the truth. If the true state is sL, informed individuals will have a smaller posterior for
sR than average. One is then more likely to meet an informed person among a group of
individuals whose posterior for sR is small.
Since u(φLL) > u(φ
L
R), equation (1) implies that U
L(p′; ρˆ) is decreasing in p′. Thus,
the incentive to join a group with low values of p′ (i.e., group L) is higher among
individuals with low values of p′. Similarly, let S = 1− F . Then, the ratio of informed
to uninformed persons in group R in each state is given by
φRL =
pi(qS(ρˆ+ k) + (1− q)S(ρˆ− k))
(1− pi)(0.5S(ρˆ+ k) + 0.5S(ρˆ− k))
;
φRR =
pi((1− q)S(ρˆ+ k) + qS(ρˆ− k))
(1− pi)(0.5S(ρˆ+ k) + 0.5S(ρˆ− k))
.
Since u(φRR) > u(φ
R
L ), the function U
R(p′; ρˆ) is increasing in p′. Thus, individuals with
high values of p′ have a greater incentive to join group R. This means that individuals
with different beliefs p′ have the tendency to segregate themselves into two distinct social
groups. Indeed, the following result holds.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium pˆ ∈ (0, 1) exists such that any individual with posterior
belief p′ ≤ pˆ prefers group L to R, and any individual with p′ > pˆ prefers group R to L.
Proof. The critical value pˆ is defined by the indifference condition
pˆu(φLR(ρˆ)) + (1− pˆ)u(φ
L
R(ρˆ)) = pˆu(φ
R
R(ρˆ)) + (1− pˆ)u(φ
R
R(ρˆ)). (2)
Since φLR(ρ) < pi/(1 − pi) < φ
L
L(ρ) and φ
R
R(ρ) > pi/(1 − pi) > φ
R
L (ρ) for all ρ, the left
hand side of (2) is strictly greater than the right hand side when pˆ is sufficiently close
to 0 while the reverse is true when pˆ is sufficiently close to 1. By the intermediate value
theorem, a solution pˆ ∈ (0, 1) to the indifference condition exists. Q.E.D.
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Proposition 1 establishes existence but not necessarily uniqueness of equilibrium.
In general, the equilibrium value of pˆ depends on the form of the distribution F . The
following result allows one to sidestep this dependence with an assumption about the
utility function u.
Corollary 1. If the utility function u is linear, then pˆ = 0.5 is the unique equilibrium
for any distribution function F .
Proof. The indifference condition (2) can be written as
pˆ
1− pˆ
=
u(φLL)− u(φ
R
L )
u(φRR)− u(φ
L
R)
.
When u is linear, the right hand side of this equation is identically equal to 1. Hence,
pˆ = 0.5 is the only equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The equilibrium concept introduced in this section assumes that individuals have to
choose to join exclusively one group or another. In some settings, it may be appropriate
to allow the possibility that some individuals can sample randomly from the population
at large without joining any exclusive groups. Since the overall fraction of informed
agents is pi, an individual who chooses not to join any group has utility u(pi/(1 − pi)).
Note that u(φLL) > u(pi/(1− pi)) > u(φ
L
R). Hence, a person always prefers joining group
L to sampling randomly from the population if his belief p′ is sufficiently small. We
have the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose the utility function u is weakly concave. Then there exists
pˆL ≤ 0.5 ≤ pR such that any individual with posterior belief p′ ≤ pˆL prefers to join
group L, any individual with p′ ≥ pˆR prefers to join group R, and any individual with
p′ ∈ (pˆL, pˆR) prefers to not to join any group. When u is linear, no one strictly prefers
not to join an exclusive group.
Proof. Let ρˆL = log(pˆL/(1 − pˆL)). The marginal type pˆL is determined by the
indifference condition
pˆLu(φ
L
R(ρˆL)) + (1− pˆL)u(φ
L
R(ρˆL)) = u(pi/(1− pi)). (3)
Since φLL > pi/(1 − pi) > φ
L
R, the left hand side is strictly greater than the right hand
side when pˆL is sufficiently close to 0. By Jensen’s inequality, at pˆL = 0.5, the left hand
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side of (3) is less than or equal to u(0.5φLR+0.5φ
L
L) = u(pi/(1−pi)). Hence there exists a
pˆL ∈ (0, 0.5) such that the indifference condition is satisfied. Moreover, since UL(p′; ρˆL)
is decreasing in p′, every individual with p′ < pˆL strictly prefers sampling exclusively
from group L to sampling from the general population. The proof that pˆR ∈ [0.5, 1)
follows the same logic. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 shows that even when individuals are not required to join any exclusive
group, those with extreme beliefs still prefer to collect information from like-minded
persons than to sample randomly from the population. Only individuals with moderate
beliefs prefer not to join any exclusive groups. Moreover, if u is linear, the equilibrium
entails pˆL = pˆR = 0.5. In this case, every individual prefers to join one of the two
exclusive groups.
3. Multiple Groups
In an environment with binary states, it is natural to consider an equilibrium in which the
population self-select into two distinct groups. If the model is extended to a richer state
space, the pattern of equilibrium group formation can be more complex. In particular,
individuals with moderate beliefs may prefer to interact with one another than with
people who hold more extreme views. In turns out that the existence of a multiple-
group equilibrium is not merely a straightforward generalization of the two-group case.
Proposition 3 below shows that the existence of moderate groups depends on, among
other things, the variance of the informative signal relative to the variance of the bogus
signal. If the variance of the bogus signal is either too large or too small, equilibrium
can only support two polar groups. A general discussion of multiple-group equilibrium
with unrestricted state space is beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, I study
the possibility of a three-group equilibrium when the state variable is a one-dimensional
continuous variable, using some specific assumptions regarding functional forms. In
particular, I assume that the utility function u(·) from group membership is a linear
function and that the updating of beliefs follows the linear Bayesian updating rule for
normally distributed signals. A fuller treatment of multiple-group equilibrium has to
await further work.
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Suppose the underlying state variable is represented by a one-dimensional variable
θ on the real line. Different individuals have different prior beliefs about θ. Let person
i’s beliefs about θ be described by the normal distribution N (µi, v) with mean µi and
variance v. The distribution of the prior mean µi across the population is given by the
distribution function F . That is, the mass of population with prior mean µi ≤ m is
equal to F (m).
A fraction pi of the population are informed. Each informed person observes an
informative signal Yi = θ+ ε
y
i , where ε
y
i is independent of θ and is distributed N (0, τy).
The remainder of the population are uninformed. An uninformed person i observes a
bogus signal Xi = εxi , which is distributed N (0, τx). As in Section 1, all individuals
believe that their own signals are informative. Upon observing signal Zi (Zi = Xi, Yi),
person i updates his posterior mean about θ to
µ′i = (1− β)µi + βZi,
where β = v/(v + τy).
Define the function G˜ to be the distribution of the variable (1−β)µi+βε
y
i . That is,
G˜(m) =
∫ ∞
−∞
F
(
m− βεy
1− β
)
n(εy; τy)dε
y,
where n(·; τy) is the normal density function with mean 0 and variance τy. Then, condi-
tional on θ, the mass of informed agents with posterior mean less than m is piG˜(m−βθ).
Similarly, let G denote the distribution of the variable (1− β)µi + βεxi :
G(m) =
∫ ∞
−∞
F
(
m− βεx
1− β
)
n(εx; τx)dε
x.
The mass of uninformed agents with posterior mean less than m is given by (1−pi)G(m).
For future reference, let g represent the density functions corresponding to G.
Let φj(θ) be the ratio of informed to uninformed agents in group j (j = 1, 2, . . . , J)
under state θ. The utility from joining group j for a person with posterior mean µ′ is
given by
U j(µ′) = E[u(φj(θ))], (4)
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where the expectation is taken using the subjective posterior distribution over θ. I
assume that the utility function u is linear for the subsequent analysis.
Consider an equilibrium in which people with beliefs µ′ ∈ [µˆj−1, µˆj] belong to group
j. (Set µˆ0 = −∞ and µˆJ =∞.) Then, equation (4) can be written as
U j(µ′; µˆj−1, µˆj) =
pi
1− pi
H(µˆj − βµ′)−H(µˆj−1 − βµ′)
G(µˆj)−G(µˆj−1)
, (5)
where
H(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
G˜(x− βε)n(ε; (1− β)v)dε.
The expression for H follows from the fact that the posterior variance of θ is (1− β)v.
It is straightforward to see from equation (5) and from the definition of µˆ0 and µˆJ
that U1 is monotonic decreasing in µ′ while UJ is monotonic increasing in µ′. Thus,
people with extreme beliefs tend to prefer the extreme groups.4 The following lemma
characterizes people’s preference for the less extreme groups.
Lemma 2. If the distribution F has a log-concave density, then U j(µ′; µˆj−1, µˆj) is
single-peaked in µ′ for j = 2, . . . , J − 1.
Proof. From equation (5), ∂U j/∂µ′ has the same sign as
h(µˆj−1 − βµ′)
h(µˆj − βµ′)
− 1,
where h is the density function corresponding to the distribution function H . Note
that H is a convolution of G˜ and a normal distribution, and G˜ in turn is a convolution
of F and a normal distribution. Since the normal density is log-concave, and since
the class of log-concave densities is closed under convolutions (e.g., Dharmadhikari and
Joag-dev 1988), h is log-concave. Log-concavity implies that h(µˆj−1− βµ′)/h(µˆj − βµ′)
is decreasing in µ′ for all µˆj > µˆj−1. It follows that the derivative ∂U j/∂µ′ can change
sign (from positive to negative) at most once. Q.E.D.
Suppose that society is divided into three groups. Lemma 2 implies that preference
for group 2 (the moderate group) is most intense among people with moderate posterior
4 For this reason, an equilibrium with two groups always exists.
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beliefs. However, even though U2 reaches a peak at some intermediate value of µ′, this
peak may not be higher than U1 or U3. For group 2 to be viable, the moderates must
prefer the moderate group to the extreme groups. Similarly, in a three-group equilibrium,
people with extreme beliefs must prefer their respective extreme groups to the moderate
group. Existence of equilibrium can be established by making the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The function h(x− d)/g(x) is unimodal in x for all d.
Assumption 2. The function g(x)/h((1− β)x) is unimodal in x for fixed β.
Assumption 3. For any d2 > d1, limx→∞ h(d2−x)/h(d1−x) =∞ and limx→−∞ h(d2−
x)/h(d1 − x) = 0.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the density function h is log-concave and satisfies Assump-
tions 1–3. There exists a three-group equilibrium in which individuals with µ′ ∈ [−∞, µˆ1]
belong to group 1, those with µ′ ∈ (µˆ1, µˆ2) belong to group 2, and those with µ′ ∈ [µˆ2,∞]
belong to group 3. The critical values satisfy µˆ1 < µˆ2 and
H(µˆ2 − βµˆ1)−H(µˆ1 − βµˆ1)
G(µˆ2)−G(µˆ1)
=
H(µˆ1 − βµˆ1)
G(µˆ1)
;
1−H(µˆ2 − βµˆ2)
1−G(µˆ2)
=
H(µˆ2 − βµˆ2)−H(µˆ1 − βµˆ2)
G(µˆ2)−G(µˆ1)
.
(6)
The proof of Proposition 3 involves several steps and is relegated to the Appendix.
Briefly, equation (6) is the indifference condition for the critical types:
U1(µˆ′1; µˆ1, µˆ2) = U
2(µˆ′1; µˆ1, µˆ2),
U2(µˆ′2; µˆ1, µˆ2) = U
3(µˆ′2; µˆ1, µˆ2),
(7)
One can think of these two conditions as defining two implicit functions, µˆ′i = ψ
i(µˆ1, µˆ2)
for i = 1, 2. The equilibrium cutoff values are characterized by the fixed point of this
mapping. Assumption 3 is a technical condition invoked to guarantee that these implicit
functions exist. Assumption 1 is used to ensure that µˆ′1 < µˆ
′
2 for any µˆ1 < µˆ2. Assump-
tion 2 is required to ensure that µˆ′i remains bounded for any bounded µˆi (i = 1, 2).
The fixed point theorem then implies that a solution to (6) exists and satisfies µˆ1 < µˆ2.
Finally, log-concavity of h is used to show that indifference by the critical types implies
strict preference by people with beliefs in the interior of the group boundaries. That is,
13
the indifference condition (7) suffices to characterize an equilibrium in which no member
of any group has an incentive to move to another group.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are related to the concept of “conditional variability order-
ing” introduced by Whitt (1980).5 Since they play an important role in the proof of
Proposition 3, it is useful to discuss their economic interpretation. Recall that H is the
(subjective) cross sectional distribution of the posteriors of informed agents, given by
µ′y = (1−β)µ+βθ+βε
y, while G is the distribution of the posteriors among uninformed
agents, given by µ′x = (1− β)µ+ βε
x. If the distribution of priors is normal, then both
H and G are normal as well. In this case, Assumption 1 is satisfied if and only if
var(µ′y)
var(µ′x)
< 1. (8)
When the relative variance in (8) is too large, informed agents are dispersed toward
the two ends of the distribution and the chances of meeting an informed person in the
moderate group is small. In that case, a three-group equilibrium is not possible because
no one wants to join the moderate group. When both H and G are normal, Assumption
2 is satisfied if and only if
var(µ′y)
var(µ′x)
> (1− β)2. (9)
If the relative variance is too small, there are too many uninformed agents near the two
ends of the distribution. Again, a three-group equilibrium cannot be supported because
even people with extreme posteriors would leave the extreme groups to join the moderate
group.
Numerical calculations based on the case in which F is a standard normal distribu-
tion illustrates this intuition. For example, if τy = 1 and v = 1, a solution to equation
(6) exists only for τx ∈ (1.5, 9), which corresponds to the bounds specified in (8) and
(9).6 In this range, µˆ1 decreases while µˆ2 increases with τx. In other words, as the
5 See also Metzger and Ruschendorf (1991) for how the unimodality of the ratio of the density
functions implies the conditional variability ordering.
6 If τx = τy, uncertainty about θ implies that the informative signal Yi = θ + ε
y
i is more variable
than the bogus signal Xi = εxi . In that case, equilibrium can only support two groups since people
expect any moderate group to consist of primarily uninformed agents. In a more general setup, one
can let Xi = ζi + εxi , where ζi is the bias of the bogus signal. If var(ζi) = var(θ) > var(θ | Yi), then a
moderate group can be supported in equilibrium even when τx = τy.
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bogus signal becomes more noisy, people expect the extreme groups to contain more
uninformed agents. Thus the moderate group becomes relatively more attractive and
its equilibrium size gets larger.
4. Concluding Remarks
The sorting of individuals into non-overlapping social groups is an abstraction of the
structure of social networks in the real world. Granovetter (1973) argues that while
many social networks exhibit clusters of strong ties (which resembles the social groups
described in this paper), these clusters do have some overlap mediated by what he calls
“weak ties.” Duncan Watts (1999) shows that a few random re-wiring of a clustered
network is sufficient to connect every individual in society to within a short distance
from any other individual. The equilibrium model in this paper can be used account
for the stability of cliques in the network structure, but does not adequately capture
the evolution of these cliques or provide for the role of weak ties as emphasized by
Granovetter and by Watts. In this paper, an individual chooses to join a social group,
and interacts with a randomly picked fellow member of his group each period. A more
satisfactory description of informal social networks would have social groups emerge
endogenously as a result of repeated interactions among a cluster of individuals. A step
toward that direction may be to embed the present model in a search framework. For
example, a pair of individuals may meet each other at random, but they can choose to
maintain or sever their tie depending on their assessment of the probability that the
other partner is informed. Another possible extension of the model is to explore the
relationship between the core beliefs of a group and its peripheral beliefs as in Murphy
and Shleifer (2004). For example, the state variable may be taken to be two-dimensional,
and the set of informed persons for one issue may not be the same as the set of informed
persons for the other issue. Finally, this paper assumes that people speak the truth when
they exchange information with one another. The strategic manipulation of information
(e.g., Prendergast 1993; Morris 2001) is another area for further investigation. Although
none of these extensions is a straightforward exercise, I hope this paper will provide a
useful framework and starting point for thinking about more complicated problems in
15
the analysis of social networks and social influence.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
For µˆ1 < µˆ2, the indifference conditions (9) can be written as
H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′1)
H(µˆ1 − βµˆ′1)
−
G(µˆ2)
G(µˆ1)
= 0; (A1)
1−H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′2)
1−H(µˆ1 − βµˆ′2)
−
1−G(µˆ2)
1−G(µˆ1)
= 0. (A2)
One can think of (A1) and (A2) as defining two implicit functions, µˆ′i = ψ
i(µˆ1, µˆ2),
i = 1, 2. For µˆ1 = µˆ2, (A1) and (A2) do not uniquely determine µˆ′1 and µˆ
′
2. In this case,
since
lim
µˆ1→µˆ2
U2(µ′; µˆ1, µˆ2) =
pi
1− pi
h(µˆ2 − βµ′)
g(µˆ2)
,
let ψ1 and ψ2 be implicitly defined by the solution to, respectively,
h(µˆ1 − βµˆ′1)
H(µˆ1 − βµˆ′1)
−
g(µˆ1)
G(µˆ1)
= 0; (A1′)
−
h(µˆ2 − βµˆ′2)
1−H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′2)
+
g(µˆ2)
1−G(µˆ1)
= 0. (A2′)
The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1. For all µˆ1 ≤ µˆ2, ψi(µˆ1, µˆ2) (i = 1, 2) exists and is unique.
When µˆ1 < µˆ2, the left-hand-side of (A1) approaches 1 as µˆ′1 approaches −∞ because
of the nature of distribution function. This ratio approaches∞ as µˆ′1 approaches infinity
by Assumption 3. Since the right-hand-side of (A1) is greater than 1, by the intermediate
value theorem, there is a finite µˆ′1 that solves (A1). Furthermore, since h is log-concave,
the left-hand-side of (A1) is increasing in µˆ′1. Hence the solution is unique. Similar
reasoning establishes that the solution to (A2) exists and is unique.
When µˆ1 = µˆ2, Assumption 3 implies that the left-hand-side of (A1′) approaches 0
and ∞ as µˆ′1 approaches minus and plus infinity. Moreover, log-concavity of h implies
that this expression is increasing in µˆ′1. Hence, a unique solution to (A1
′) exists. A
similar argument suggests that µˆ′2 exists and is unique when µˆ1 = µˆ2.
Step 2. For all µˆ1 ≤ µˆ2, µˆ′1 ≤ µˆ
′
2.
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Suppose the opposite is true, i.e., µˆ′1 > µˆ
′
2. Then,
1−H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′2)
1−H(µˆ1 − βµˆ′2)
−
1−G(µˆ2)
1−G(µˆ1)
<
1−H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′1)
1−H(µˆ1 − βµˆ′1)
−
1−G(µˆ2)
1−G(µˆ1)
=
G(µˆ2)−G(µˆ1)
(1−H(µˆ1 − βµˆ′1))(1−G(µˆ1))
(
1−
H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′1)
G(µˆ2)
)
, (A3)
where the inequality follows from the log-concavity of h and the equality follows from
(A1).
Now, by Assumption 1, the function h(x−βµˆ′1)/g(x) is unimodal in x. Unimodality
of h/g implies unimodality of H/G (see, for example, Metzger and Ruschendorf 1991).
So if (A1) holds, it must be the case that
H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′1)
G(µˆ2)
> lim
x→∞
H(x− βµˆ′1)
G(x)
= 1.
In other words, the expression (A3) is strictly negative, which contradicts (A2).
Suppose µˆ1 = µˆ2, and assume that µˆ′1 > µˆ
′
2. Then,
−
h(µˆ2 − βµˆ′2)
1−H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′2)
+
g(µˆ2)
1−G(µˆ2)
< −
h(µˆ2 − βµˆ′1)
1−H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′1)
+
g(µˆ2)
1−G(µˆ2)
=
g(µˆ2)
(1−H(µˆ2 − βµˆ′2))(1−G(µˆ2))
(
1−
H(µˆ1 − βµˆ′1)
G(µˆ1)
)
. (A3′)
When (A1′) holds, it must be the case that
H(µˆ1 − βµˆ′1)
G(µˆ1)
> lim
x→∞
H(x− βµˆ′1)
G(x)
= 1.
In other words, the expression (A3′) is strictly negative, which contradicts (A2′).
Step 3. The function ψi(µˆ1, µˆ2) (i = 1, 2) is increasing in both arguments.
Differentiate (A1) with respect to µˆ1 to get
∂(H2/H1)
∂µˆ′
1
∂ψ1
∂µˆ1
=
H2g1
H2
1
(
h1
g1
−
H1
G1
)
,
where H1 stands for value of the function H(x − βµˆ′1) at the point x = µˆ1, etc. Log-
concavity of h implies that ∂(H2/H1)/∂µˆ′1 > 0. The unimodal property of h(x−d)/g(x)
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implies that H/G < h/g when H/G is increasing, and H/G > h/g when H/G is
decreasing. Since H/G is increasing at x = µˆ1, h1/g1 > H1/G1. Hence, ∂ψ1/∂µˆ1 > 0.
Differentiate (A1) with respect to µˆ2 to get
∂(H2/H1)
∂µˆ′
1
∂ψ1
∂µˆ2
=
g2
H1
(
H2
G2
−
h2
g2
)
.
Since H/G is decreasing at x = µˆ2, unimodality of h(x− d)/g(x) implies that H2/G2 >
h2/g2. Hence, ∂ψ1/∂µˆ2 > 0. The monotonicity of ψ2 can be established similarly.
Step 4. The function ψi(µˆ1, µˆ2) (i = 1, 2) is bounded for bounded µˆ1 and µˆ2.
By Assumption 2, g(x)/h((1 − β)x) is unimodal in x. This in turn implies that
G(x)/H((1−β)x) and (1−G(x))/(1−H((1−β)x)) are both unimodal in x. Let mu be
the mode of G(x)/H((1−β)x) and ml be the mode of (1−G(x))/(1−H(1−β)x)). Since
G(x)/H((1−β)x) reaches a peak when g(x)/h((1−β)x) is falling while (1−G(x))/(1−
H((1− β)x)) reaches a peak when g(x)/h((1− β)x) is rising, mu > ml. The remainder
of this step establishes ml ≤ µˆ′1 ≤ µˆ
′
2 ≤ mu for all ml ≤ µˆ1 < µˆ2 ≤ mu.
Let µˆ1 = µˆ2 = ml, and suppose µˆ′1 = ml. Then the left-hand-side of (A1
′) is equal
to
h((1− β)ml)
H((1− β)ml)
−
g(ml)
G(ml)
. (A4)
Notice that Assumption 2 implies that g(x)/h((1 − β)x) > G(x)/H((1 − β)x) when
x = ml < mu; hence (A4) is negative. Since H2/H1 − G2/G1 is increasing in µˆ′1, in
order for (A1′) to hold, it must be the case that µˆ′1 > ml. Finally, by the monotonicity
of the ψ1, for all µˆ2 ≥ µˆ1 ≥ ml,
ψ1(µˆ1, µˆ2) ≥ ψ
1(ml, ml) > ml.
To show that µˆ′2 < mu, let µˆ1 = µˆ2 = mu, and suppose µˆ
′
2 = mu. Then, the
left-hand-side of (A2′) is equal to
−
h((1− β)mu)
1−H((1− β)mu)
+
g(mu)
1−G(mu)
. (A5)
Assumption 2 implies that g(x)/h((1−β)x) > (1−G(x))/(1−H((1−β)x) at x = mu >
ml; hence (A5) is positive. Since (1 − H2)/(1 −H1) − (1 − G2)/(1− G1) is increasing
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in µˆ′2, in order for (A2
′) to hold, it must be the case that µˆ′2 < mu. Furthermore, for all
µˆ1 ≤ µˆ2 ≤ mu, we have
ψ2(µˆ1, µˆ2) ≤ ψ
2(mu, mu) < mu.
Step 5. The fixed point of the mapping ψ exists such that µˆ1 < µˆ2.
Let T = {(x, y) : ml ≤ x ≤ y ≤ mu}. The previous steps establishes that ψ is a
mapping from T to T . Hence a fixed point (µˆ1, µˆ2) ∈ T of ψ exists. Moreover, this fixed
point must be such that µˆ1 < µˆ2. Suppose otherwise; that is, let µˆ1 = µˆ2 = µˆ. Then,
(A1′) and (A2′) require
H(µˆ− βµˆ)
G(µˆ)
=
h(µˆ− βµˆ)
g(µˆ)
=
1−H(µˆ− βµˆ)
1−G(µˆ)
.
But the first equality holds only at µˆ = mu while the second equality holds only at
µˆ = ml. Since mu #= ml, this is a contradiction.
Step 6. Indifference by the critical types implies strict preference by the interior types.
Since (A1) holds at µˆ′1 = µˆ1, and since log-concavity of h implies (A1) is increasing
in µˆ′1, any individual with a posterior less than µˆ1 prefers group 1 to group 2. Similarly,
log-concavity of h implies (A2) is increasing in µˆ′2. So any individual with a posterior
less that µˆ2 prefers group 2 to group 3. This means that group 1 is the best group for
individuals with posteriors in the range [−∞, µˆ1]. Similar reasoning establishes that for
µ′ ∈ [µˆj−1, µˆj] (j = 2, 3),
max{U1(µ′), U2(µ′), U3(µ′)} = U j(µ).
Q.E.D.
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